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Monday, October 19, 2009

The Development of Modern Logic Online

Leila Haapaaranta's collection The Development of Modern Logic came out earlier this year. It's a handy one-volume compendium to the history of logic in the modern era (full disclosure: I have an article in it). The price tag might still be a bit steep: $150, although that buys you over 1,000 pages of scholarship in an attractive hardback volume! But if you have access to Oxford Scholarship Online, you can now also read the book over the intertubes.

Also online now: JC Beall's Spandrels of Truth.

Videos from Foundational Adventures Conference

Last May, Ohio State had a conference in honor of Harvey Friedman's 60th birthday. Videos of the talks are now available (via Neil Tennant). These include talks by Friedman himself, as well as John Burgess, Sam Buss, Mic Detlefsen, Sol Feferman, Hartry Field, Rohit Parikh, Grisha Mints, Wilfried Sieg, Ted Slaman, Patrick Suppes, and many others.

T-Rex on Hilbert's Infinite Hotel

Today on Dinosaur Comics:

Wednesday, October 14, 2009

Per Lindstöm, 1936-2009

From the ASL Newsletter, I just learned that Per Lindström died two months ago:
Per (Pelle) Lindström, the Swedish logician, died in Gothenburg, Sweden, on August 21, 2009, after a short period of illness. He was born on April 9, 1936, and spent most of his academic life at the Department of Philosophy, University of Gothenburg, where he was employed first as a lecturer ('docent') and, from 1991 until his retirement in 2001, as a Professor of Logic. Lindström is most famous for his work in model theory. In 1964 he made his first major contribution, the so-called Lindström's test for model completeness (c.f., Chang & Keisler, Model Theory, 3rd ed., Thm. 3.5.9: if a countable set of first-order sentences has only infinite models, is categorical in some infinite power, and is such that the set of its models is closed under unions of chains, then it is model complete). In 1966 he proved the undefinability of well-order in Lω1ω (obtained independently and in more generality by Lopez-Escobar), an early example of the use of recursion theory to obtain model-theoretic results. The same year he also introduced the concept of a Lindström quantifier, which has now become standard in model theory, theoretical computer science, and formal semantics. The paper also contains a characterization of elementary logic among logics with generalized quantifiers, generalizing a result by Mostowski. The proof uses Lindström's version of what is now known as Ehrenfeucht-Fraissé (EF) games, a concept he came up with independently. Another paper from 1966 ("On relations between structures") gives a powerful and extremely general formulation of a preservation/interpolation theorem, again based on EF games. These results were published in the Swedish philosophical journal Theoria and written in an extremely terse style, which had the effect that they escaped the notice of most of the logic community for a while. It was his 1969 paper "On extensions of elementary logic" (also in Theoria), where he presented his famous characterizations of first-order logic---Lindström's Theorem---in terms of properties such as compactness, completeness, and Löwenheim-Skolem properties, that was first recognized as a major contribution to logic. It laid the foundation of what has become known as abstract model theory (c.f., Barwise & Feferman (eds.), Model-Theoretic Logics, 1975). The proof was based on EF games and on a new proof of interpolation, following the line of argument in the papers on relations between structures and Lindström quantifiers. Several other characterizations of first-order logic followed in later papers. Beginning at the end of the 1970's, Lindström turned his attention to the study of formal arithmetic and interpretability. He started a truly systematic investigation of this topic, which had been somewhat dormant since Feferman's pioneering contributions in the late 1950's. In doing so he invented novel technically advanced tools, for example, the so-called Lindström fixed point construction, a far-reaching application of Gödel's diagonalization lemma to define arithmetical formulas with specific properties. His approach to interpretability was based on the study of related lattices, such as the lattice of interpretability types over a fixed extension of Peano Arithmetic (PA), or the lattices of Σn- and Πn -sentences over PA, for some fixed n, and he established many interesting structural properties of these. Other memorable results include the Lindström-Solovay theorem that the interpretability relation between sentences over PA is Π20-complete and the characterization of faithful interpretability over PA as a combination of Π1- and Σ1-conservativity. In the 1990's, he also contributed to the area of provability logic: he gave a simplified proof of the de Jongh-Sambin fixed point theorem and characterized the bimodal logic of PA and PA augmented by the reflection rule: infer a sentence φ from 'φ is provable'.

Pelle Lindström had an exceptionally clear and concise style in writing mathematical logic. His 1997 book, Aspects of Incompleteness, remains a perfect example: it provides a systematic introduction to his work in arithmetic and interpretability. The book is short but rich in material; it also contains some results one cannot find in journal publications, for example, his solution to one of the 102 problems formulated by Harvey Friedman.

Throughout his life, Pelle Lindström also took an active interest in philosophy. He participated in the debate following Roger Penrose's new version of the argument that Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems show that the human mind is not mechanical. He presented his own philosophy of mathematics, which he called 'quasi-realism', in a paper in The Monist in 2000. It is based on the idea that the 'visualizable' parts of mathematics are beyond doubt (and that classical logic holds for them). He counted as visualizable not only the ω-sequence of natural numbers but also arbitrary sets of numbers, the latter visualizable as branches in the infinite binary tree, whereas nothing similar can be said for sets of sets of numbers, for example. Moreover, he made numerous contributions over the years to the Swedish popular philosophy journal Filosofisk Tidskrift---one of these will be published posthumously---on subjects as diverse as the freedom of will, the mind-body problem, utilitarianism, and counterfactuals.

Pelle Lindström will be remembered by the logic community as a great logician, and by his family, friends and colleagues as a remarkable human being.

Monday, October 12, 2009

Reforming Graduate Education

New book out from Princeton UP on the Graduate Education Initiative of the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, discussed on Inside Higher Ed. Not sure if any philosophy departments participated. In light of previous discussion on differential attrition rates for women in the pipeline, this should be interesting:
Chapter 7 addresses a matter of continuing concern among students, their professors, and administrators. Do marriage and childbearing affect the chances men and women have of completing their degrees and of doing so promptly? Although these questions are not at issue in the GEI, they are important. As a result, we made sure the student survey would yield data on students’ marital status when they entered graduate school and whether they had children at the time. In light of the increasing numbers of women earning PhDs in all fields and their very significant representation in the humanities, having an understanding of the relationships linking gender, marital status, and parenthood and the collective impact of all three on completion and TTD is likely to become increasingly important in the years ahead. Gender differences on average favor men, but we find these differences are due solely to the fact that married men do better than single men and single women. Marriage benefits men but does not do the same for women.

Sunday, October 11, 2009

Women in the Academic Pipeline II

Following up on my previous post, Women in the Academic Pipeline, where I compared rates at which women earned BAs and PhDs in various fields in the US: what does it look like in the faculty ranks? Not surprisingly, the percentages in general go down as you go higher, but there are some interesting (and disturbing) things to notice. First, the data:
Teaching fieldBAPhDLecturer/
Instructor/
Other

Assistant
Associate
Full
Biological sciences62.2%46.5%47.7%±7.5%37.9%±7.3%25.9%±5.9%20.4%±5.4%
Computer and information sciences25.1%22.0%31.9%±4.9%27.1%±11.6%31.6%±12.5%26.8%±14.3%
Engineering18.8%17.7%11.3%±5.0%10.2%±7.1%9.2%±4.3%4.3%±2.8%
english68.9%60.3%67.3%±4.2%60.4%±12.1%56.5%±12.1%41.7%±9.0%
Mathematics and statistics46.0%28.1%42.3%±5.9%32.9%±13.2%24.5%±11.7%17.8%±7.2%
Philosophy29.2%31.4%23.8%±12.3%14.0%±12.3%29.3%±21.8%12.6%±12.9%
physical sciences41.7%27.8%31.6%±6.9%29.3%±10.4%19.1%±7.8%8.9%±4.4%
Social sciences50.9%42.6%33.1%±5.4%36.2%±8.7%32.6%±7.2%19.7%±4.5%

This data comes from the U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, 2004 National Study of Postsecondary Faculty (NSOPF:04) and was generated from a table generated using their convenient QuickStats feature. The BA and PhD percentages come from the previous post, for 2003-04 graduates.

The representations of women among Assistant Professors in philosophy (14%) is much lower than expected, and among Associate Professors (24%) much higher than expected. Why? Are the women getting stuck at the Associate Professor rank? In most fields women are better represented in the instructor ranks than in the PhD pool, except in engineering, the physical sciences, and philosophy. And in computer science, the line goes up and not down. Sign something they did in the 90s to increase women representation among faculty worked?

UPDATE: Prompted by Kenny's comment, I computed the errors on those figures, and since they are rather large for some data points (especially pfor philosophy), take these with a grain of salt! And ignore the last paragraph.

Leitgeb's "Untimely Review" of Carnap's Aufbau

Topoi has a series of "untimely reviews", where classic works of philosophy are reviewed as if they had just been published. Hannes Leitgeb did one on Carnap's Aufbau, where he not only pretends that it was just published, but also pretends (as I guess you'd have to if you take the premise seriously) that it wasn't published 80 years ago (philosophy would have looked very different). I would write more and link to it, but I discovered that Chris Pincock blogged this already three months ago (and I missed it/forgot about it), so I'll just send you over to his great blog. Also, read Chris's Philosophy Compass paper on the Aufbau! And: Hannes's serious, substantial, long-awaited paper "New life for Carnap's Aufbau?" is out in Synthese online first (free preprint in the philsci archive). Here many of the things he hints at in the review are spelled out.

Friday, October 09, 2009

Women in the Academic Pipeline

Catarina's comment on the previous post prompted me to find out what the pipeline looks like in philosophy, and so I went to the tables from the Digest of Education Statistics (of the US, tables of Bachelor's, master's, and doctor's degrees conferred by degree-granting institutions, by sex of student and field of study) and made a handy table plus graph:


Biological sciences BA Biological sciences PhD Computer sciences BA Computer sciences PhD Engineering BA Engineering PhD English BA English PhD Mathematics BA Mathematics PhD Philosophy BA Philosophy PhD Physical sciences BA Physical sciences PhD Social sciences BA Social sciences PhD

















































2006-07 60.1% 49.3% 18.6% 20.6% 16.9% 20.9% 68.3% 59.4% 44.1% 29.8% 31.2% 25.3% 40.9% 31.6% 49.8% 45.1%

















































2005-06 61.5% 49.2% 20.6% 21.7% 17.9% 20.2% 68.6% 59.3% 45.1% 29.5% 30.9% 26.8% 41.8% 30.0% 50.0% 43.3%

















































2004-05 61.9% 49.0% 22.2% 19.1% 18.3% 18.7% 68.5% 59.2% 44.7% 28.5% 29.7% 23.9% 42.2% 27.9% 50.5% 42.8%

















































2003-04 62.2% 46.5% 25.1% 22.0% 18.8% 17.7% 68.9% 60.3% 46.0% 28.1% 29.2% 31.4% 41.7% 27.8% 50.9% 42.6%

















































2002-03 61.9% 45.8% 27.0% 20.6% 18.7% 17.2% 68.8% 60.5% 45.8% 27.1% 32.2% 26.8% 41.2% 27.6% 51.5% 43.0%

















































2001-02 60.8% 44.3% 27.6% 22.8% 18.9% 17.3% 68.6% 58.5% 46.7% 29.0% 33.0% 23.6% 42.2% 28.0% 51.7% 43.1%

















































2000-01 59.5% 44.1% 27.7% 17.7% 18.2% 16.5% 68.4% 60.3% 47.7% 28.8% 31.4% 25.3% 41.2% 26.8% 51.8% 41.4%

















































1999-01 58.3% 44.1% 28.1% 16.9% 18.5% 15.5% 67.9% 58.8% 47.1% 25.0% 31.5% 30.1% 40.3% 25.5% 51.2% 41.2%

















































1998-99 56.5% 42.2% 27.1% 18.9% 17.7% 14.3% 67.4% 60.3% 47.8% 26.2% 30.3% 24.5% 39.9% 24.2% 50.5% 41.1%

















































1997-98 55.1% 42.5% 26.7% 16.3% 16.9% 12.2% 66.9% 59.1% 46.5% 25.7% 31.3% 28.0% 38.4% 25.2% 49.2% 40.8%

Click on the image to see a larger version.
The zig-zaggyness of the philosophy PhD line (dashed red) is probably just caused by the fact that there are relatively few philosophy PhDs awarded each year--under 400 versus between 1,100 and 8,000 for the other fields. Discuss.

NOTE: Evelyn Brister has collected these data for several years on the Knowledge and Experience blog. Be sure to check over there (click on the links on the left side) for additional info and discussion.

UPDATE: More pipeline data, now with faculty by rank!

Thursday, October 08, 2009

Women in Philosophy

I'm glad to see some more discussion of the gender situation in philosophy discussed more widely. It started with an article in The Philosopher's Magazine, "Where are all the women?" which was then picked up in "A dearth of women philosophers" in the NYT. There are some interesting responses on Feminist Philosophers blog (first, second, third post), on Edge of the American West, on Knowledge and Experience, and mentioned on Leiter's blog.

For background data (not in philosophy, but in science and engineering) on research on gender differences in aptitude, patters and mechanisms of discrimination, trends, etc., I can only recommend again the definitive report of the National Academies' Committee on Maximizing the Potential of Women in Academic Science and Engineering from 2007:

Beyond Bias and Barriers: Fulfilling the Potential of Women in Academic Science and Engineering

as well as a new report (2009):

Gender Differences at Critical Transitions in the Careers of Science, Engineering, and Mathematics Faculty

It's instructive to compare philosophy to mathematics: roughly the same numbers, but in mathematics it has been improving (31% women math PhDs in 2008 vs 24% 10 years earlier) while in philosophy the numbers have remained around 28% for a while.

Thursday, October 01, 2009

New Natural Deduction Software for Mac

Deductions is a program that is designed to help understand and construct proofs in natural deduction (in the Logic Book style). It runs only on Macs, so I couldn't try it out, but the videos look interesting.

Tuesday, September 29, 2009

Logic and Madness?

Since reading Logicomix (which, as I said, I really like), I've been wondering about the "logic and madness" theme that runs through the book. In the making-of movie (which I also recommend), Papadimitriou says at the beginning, "We were both interested in this very curious fact, that the majority of the protagonists of this intellectual adventure [the quest for mathematical foundations] ended up insane" and Doxiadis cites the well known line from Gian-Carlo Rota's Indiscrete Thoughts:
It cannot be a complete coincidence that several outstanding logicians of the twentieth century found shelter in asylums at some point in their lives: Cantor, Zermelo, Gödel and Post are some. (p. 4)
And, if you've read the book, you'll probably agree that the "logic and madness" theme does make for a great story. But is it true? Is there a link between logic and madness?

First, some facts, and corrections of claims of facts. It is well known that Georg Cantor underwent psychiatric treatment and "died in an asylum". But as Grattan-Guiness and Dauben have documented, it was neither Kronecker's attacks on Cantor's set theory, nor Cantor's failure to solve the continuum hypothesis that drove him mad. Cantor suffered from bipolar affective disorder, i.e., he was manic depressive, and stress such as that caused by having your work viciously attacked by a leading member of the profession, or that caused by expending every last effort and yet failing to prove a theorem, caused the onset of manic periods. He would have had such attacks also if he hadn't invented set theory (see Dauben's Georg Cantor, Ch. 12, esp. p. 285; Dauben is very critical of people like E. T. Bell here, and offers a very nuanced interpretation of the relationship between Cantor's mental health and his mathematics). Remember, this all happened between 1884 and 1918, when no effective treatment for bipolar disorder was available; lithium wasn't used until the 1950s and approved by the FDA for this use only in 1970.

Emil Post likewise was manic depressive, and died from a heart attack following electric shock therapy he was undergoing in 1954. And Gödel did die because he starved himself to death as he suffered from the paranoid fear that people were trying to poison him. But also Gödel's mental health problems manifested themselves quite early, and not as a result of a lifetime of work on logic, or because he couldn't prove the continuum hypothesis (see Dawson's Logical Dilemmas). In addition to Cantor, Post, and Gödel, Moses Schönfinkel, the inventor of combinatory logic, is reported to have been mentally ill.

What about the others? Rota mentions Peano and Zermelo. I couldn't find any evidence that either of them had mental health problems. Both spent time in medical institutions, but underwent treatment not for mental health problems but for lung disease.

That leaves Frege. In Logicomix, Frege is portrayed as a raving lunatic spewing paranoid anti-semitic nonsense. In the biographical section at the end of the book, one reads the following:
In the last decades of his life, Frege became increasingly paranoid, writing a series of rabid treatises attacking parliamentary democracy, labor unions, foreigners, and especially, the Jews, even suggesting a "final solution" to the "Jewish problem". (p. 325-326)
The source of these claims is Frege's infamous "political diary" (edited by Gottfried Gabriel and Wolfgang Kienzler, "Frege's politisches Tagebuch", Deutsche philosophische Zeitschrift 42:6 (1994) p.105–1098; translated by Richard Mendelsohn, "Diary: Written by professor Dr Gottlob Frege in the time from 10 March to 9 April 1924", Inquiry 39 (1996) 303–342; you can get a taste for them with a bit of background in Stroll's Twentieth-century Analytic Philosophy and in the chapter on Frege in Martin Davis' The Universal Computer). As you can see for yourself, the diaries reveal the very dark side of Frege's political views: reactionary, anti-semitic, anti-catholic, anti-socialist. But: Frege didn't write "increasingly rabid treatises" over "the last decades of his life"—these are diary entries written over two months in the very last year before he died. As far as I can tell, he never advocated a "final solution" to the "Jewish problem" with anything like the meaning that these terms have taken on, and he didn't use this Nazi terminology. There is no indication that he admired Hitler (he opposed the Munich Putsch of 1923), and there's no indication that his anti-semitism was racially motivated or anywhere near the level of the Nazis. But most importantly: He wasn't clinically paranoid. As objectionable as his views are, they were widespread in Germany at the time (Had they not been, Hitler would never have come to power). Moreover, if he had been paranoid, this would, I think, absolve Frege of moral responsibility. After all, we don't hold people morally (or legally) responsible for their actions when they're insane. So: Frege: reactionary anti-semite, but no Nazi, and not insane.

Of the "protagonists of this intellectual adventure", four (Cantor, Schönfinkel, Gödel, Post) had mental health issues. We don't know enough about Schönfinkel, Cantor and Post were manic depressives, Gödel more than the others, and probably paranoid schizophrenic. Is that "a majority"? Is it even a statistically significant increase from the norm?

The National Institutes of Mental Health puts the percentage of the US population with "serious mental illness" at 6%. What's the percentage of pioneers of logic with a serious mental illness? We've found four, but what's the sample? Let's say Rota had in mind the authors of papers in van Heijenoort's From Frege to Gödel. That's 30, and doesn't even include Tarski, Lukasiewicz, Church, Fraenkel, Gentzen, Turing (all not insane), or many of the less well known people working in foundations at around that time. So: 13% of the pioneers of logic had a serious mental illness. But with a sample of 30, the margin of error has to be huge. I'm no statistician, but using the standard formula, I get a margin of error of ±12% (
ok, I know you probably shouldn't use the standard formula for samples this small; if you know stats, help me out, please). This suggests that there's good reason to think that Rota's claim is just wrong: it may very well be pure coincidence.

All this of course doesn't detract from the good story told in Logicomix, which, after all is mainly about Russell, about his personal life, and about his struggle with the foundations of mathematics; the "logic and madness" theme isn't that pronounced. But that story does play into a myth that, if taken on its own, is not exactly the image any field of science wants to project (or have painted) of itself: that it's the domain of lunatics. It's not only detrimental to the field and hurtful to the people working in it, it also distorts and minimizes the actual personal struggles of the protagonists and the interesting historical context. All of these people lived through one world war, many of them through two and the toughest economic times of the last 100 years. Some were forced to flee their home countries, some faced persecution and prejudice, some personal tragedy, some professional misfortune. Most of them produced their groundbreaking results despite these obstacles. These are the important stories, not any myths about how doing logic drives people mad.


Free Peano Biography

A revised version of Hubert Kennedy's 1980 biography of Giuseppe Peano, is available as a free download and a cheap print-on-demand paperback through lulu.com: Peano: Life and Works of Giuseppe Peano.

Monday, September 28, 2009

The Thrilling Adventures of Lovelace and Babbage

Sydney Padua has produced a number of amazing and funny comics on Ada Lovelace, Charles Babbage, and the Difference Engine. It's a bit hard to navigate, to get to all three installments of "Lovelace and Babbage vs. The Economy" you have to click on the "Economic Model" link in the sidebar. The upside is, though, that you'll get to browse through Sydney's many intriguing links and finds that follow the strips. If there wasn't work to be done, I'd probably trace her steps and learn all kinds of fun and interesting things about these two pioneers of computing!

The BBC Techlab has a 6-panel strip (colored) by Sydney up here. A pity that Ada is only "guest-starring" there.

Sunday, September 27, 2009

Deadly Ambiguity

Several of the commenters on my previous post on motivating the study of logic in my intro class have suggested that one important aspect of logic is the precision it affords, and hence the usefulness of logic in avoiding ambiguities. So I tried to find some nice examples of where ambiguity in natural language—and the resulting different interpretations—can have important consequences. (I'm still looking for examples, especially form philosophy!) I happened upon a paper entitled "Syntactic Ambiguity" by Paul Conway, which gives some very nice actual examples from law. I picked one of the examples that can be dealt with in propositional logic (no quantifiers used yet).
a is a cube in front of b, or a tetrahedron in front of b, or to the left of b.
That's ambiguous between*
(Cube(a) ∧ FrontOf(a, b)) ∨
(Tet(a) ∧ (FrontOf(a, b) ∨ LeftOf(a, b))
and
(Cube(a) ∧ (FrontOf(a, b) ∨ LeftOf(a, b))) ∨
(Tet(a) ∧ (FrontOf(a, b) ∨ LeftOf(a, b))
Here's the real-life example from the above paper:
In R v. Casement, Sir Roger Casement was charged with high treason contrary to Treason Act, 1351 (Eng.). It was alleged that during World War I he incited British subjects who were prisoners of war in Germany to renounce their allegiance to the King. The statute declared that treason was committed '… if a man do levy war against our Lord the King in his realm, or be adherent to the King's enemies in his realm, giving to them aid and comfort in the realm, or elsewhere, and thereof be properly attainted of open deed by the people of their condition: …'. The charge alleged adhering to the King's enemies elsewhere than in the King's realm, namely in the empire of Germany. The defence unsuccessfully submitted that the Crown had failed to prove an offence in law. 'The contention is that those words "or elsewhere" govern only the words "aid and comfort in the realm" and have no application to the words "be adherent to the King's enemies in his realm.'
I believe that part of the reason that the trial and conviction caused such an outcry, aside from the fact that Casement was famous as a humanitarian exposing human rights abuses in the Congo and Peru, was that it wasn't clear if the original document of the Treason Act contained the last comma or not.

* A third reading would be
(Cube(a) ∧ FrontOf(a, b)) ∨ (Tet(a) ∧ FrontOf(a, b)) ∨ LeftOf(a, b)
but that isn't a possible reading of the clause in the Treason Act.

Wednesday, September 23, 2009

Logicomix: An Epic Search For Truth

Yesterday's mail contained my copy of Logicomix: An Epic Search For Truth, a graphic novel by Apostolos Doxiadis and Christos Papadimitriou with art by Alecos Papadatos and Annie Di Donna. It is scheduled to be released in the US on September 29, but amazon.ca apparently already had it. The UK edition is now sold out (a second printing is scheduled to be in stores October 2). It's a compelling read for everyone interested in logic and its history, or in Bertrand Russell, or in intelligent graphic novels.

The main story arc consists in Russell giving a lecture on "The Role of Logic in Human Affairs" at "an American university" (looks like Berkeley) just after the start of WWII (September 1939). In the lecture, he tells the story of his own life, how his quest for finding certain truth led him to a study of the foundations of mathematics, discovering logic, writing Principia Mathematica with Whitehead, meeting Wittgenstein, the inter-war years with the Tractatus, the Vienna circle, and Gödel—and his personal life. There's a lot about madness and logic, the conflicts within logicians between their work and their passions, about struggle and failure. All this is interleaved with a frame story in which the authors of the book discuss what they're trying to do in the book, explain some mathematical details, and reflect on the story that Russell's telling his audience, ending with a … well, I don't want to give it away.

The book is very well done overall: it's an engaging read, the art is great, the logic and philosophy are accurate for the most part. There's a lot of license taken with historical details, but that usually makes for a better story. My favorite is the barfight between adherents of Poincaré and of Hilbert at the 1900 International Congress of Mathematicians. And, truth be told, you don't have to take much license with many of the characters in this story to make them compelling—think Wittgenstein:

There was only one thing that really bothered me: they claim—not just in the story but also in the otherwise informative background section at the end of the book—that Hilbert sent his son Franz off to an asylum when Franz was 15, that Franz spent the rest of his life there, and that Hilbert never visited him. But at least according to Constance Reid's biography of Hilbert, a) that happened when Franz was 21, b) he was in treatment only until 1917, and c) thereafter lived with the Hilberts again. I'm also no great fan of the title (it's about as unimaginative as "LogBlog" is for a logic blog). But: I am a fan of the book. Finally a logic book for the coffee table! I might even assign it for a history of logic class. Get your copy, it's even pretty reasonably priced at about $15 on amazon.com.

The website has a preview and some additional information, including nice pictures of the original locations. Feel free to reply with your own opinions, speculations, and queries about the historical details and I'll see if I can fact-check them…

UPDATE: There's a book tour which includes a stop at the LA public library, with Zlatan Damnjanovic (USC Philosophy) on Oct 7 and one at MSRI (pronounced "misery", the Mathematical Sciences Research Institute in the Berkeley hills) with Paolo Mancosu (Berkeley Philosophy) on Oct 19.

UPDATE: More on the logic and madness theme here.